Macroeconomic Effects of Selective Public Employment and Wage Subsidies by Martin Neil Baily & James Tobin
MARTIN  NEIL  BAILY 
Yale University 
JAMES  TOBIN 
Yale University 
Macroeconomic  Effects  of 
Selective  Public  Employment 
and  Wage  Subsidies 
DIRECT  JOB  CREATION and selective wage subsidies are policies de- 
signed to alter the mix of employment  in favor of workers  who, in the 
normal course of economic events, experience  high rates of unemploy- 
ment. As instruments  of macroeconomic  policy, these measures  are in- 
tended  to mitigate  the conflict  between  society's  goals for unemployment 
and  inflation.  The hope is to "cheat  the Phillips  curve."  For the short  run, 
as in the current  cyclical  recovery,  this means  to diminish  the inflationary 
consequences  of higher  rates  of employment.  For the long run, it means 
to diminish  the natural  rate of unemployment-or, to use a more  neutral 
term, the  minimal nonaccelerating-inflation  rate  of  unemployment 
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tion, and Unemployment,"  delivered by the authors at the Conference on Direct Job 
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(NAIRU). In general,  the purpose  is to allow standard  fiscal  and mone- 
tary policy to achieve  more satisfactory  joint paths of output, employ- 
ment,  and  prices. 
The basic strategy  is simple: Shift labor demand  to types of workers 
who are-because of high unemployment,  weak bargaining  power, rigid 
wages,  or other  characteristics-on relatively  flat Phillips  curves.  Let the 
government  hire,  or induce  other  employers  to hire,  workers  whose  unem- 
ployment  does little or nothing  to restrain  the advance  of wage costs in 
the aggregate.  The idea is appealing,  and our purpose  is to examine  it 
systematically.  Most of our discussion  concerns  the long run-the  possi- 
bility of reducing  the NAIRU-because  it is in that context that the 
strategy  is most  likely  to encounter  complications  and  pitfalls. 
For the strategy  to have a chance,  selective  eligibility  is essential.  Pub- 
lic employment  opportunities  or wage subsidies must be confined to 
workers whose supply and demand have relatively little to  do with 
economy-wide  inflation.  From a macroeconomic  viewpoint,  this is the 
reason  for eligibility  criteria  whose rationales  may vary greatly:  low in- 
come, low wage,  welfare  dependency,  previous  unemployment,  residence 
in a labor  surplus  area,  youth.  Open-ended  "employer  of last resort"  pro- 
grams  and general  employment  subsidies  would not carry  out the macro- 
economic  strategy  to which  our  paper  is directed. 
We will present  two analyses  of the way selective  employment  policies 
may work.  The first  is an aggregative  model of frictional  unemployment 
and  its possible  reduction.  The second  is an explicitly  disaggregated  model 
of labor markets,  in which the power of selective employment  policies 
comes from exploiting  differences  among  markets  in wage responses. 
Reducing  Frictional  Unemployment 
Excess demand  in any labor market  is measured  conceptually  by the 
algebraic  excess  of jobs over the labor  force, or of job vacancies  over the 
unemployed.  For given excess demand,  both vacancies  and unemploy- 
ment  may  be high,  or they  may  be low. Unemployment  matched  by simul- 
taneous  vacancies  is frictional  unemployment.  It is a reasonable  assump- 
tion that  inflationary  pressure  on wages  is proportional  to excess  demand, 
or depends  separately  on its components,  vacancies  and unemployment. 
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improved  by reductions  of frictional  unemployment.  Some labor-market 
policies-retraining, relocating,  and  more  efficient  exchanges  of informa- 
tion-are  specifically  designed  to place unemployed  workers  in existing 
vacancies,  or to facilitate job searches and shifts without intervening 
spells of unemployment. 
These  aims  are  not central  features  of direct  job creation.  Nevertheless, 
such programs  may indirectly diminish frictional unemployment.  Job 
vacancies  connected  with  direct  job creation  should  be minimal,  while  the 
program  itself could be a channel  for routing  unemployed  workers  to 
vacancies  in the private  sector as long as the wages and duration  of the 
jobs did not reduce  incentives  to look for alternatives.  Their availability 
may  brake  market  wage increases  nearly  as much  as if they were actually 
unemployed. 
Wage  subsidies  per se do not promise  the same  reductions  in frictional 
unemployment.  If the subsidy  for employing  an eligible  worker  is perma- 
nent and the wage is uncontrolled,  search  behavior  will not be modified. 
The mechanism  by which wage subsidies  could be effective  is described 
by the second  model  below. 
The  first  model  is as follows:X 
(1)  UL(J  x)  - L(J, x)  +  N(J, X)-=O,  O <  LJ <  NJ <  1. 
Here U is the unemployment  rate;  L is the labor force, a function  of the 
number  of jobs (or slots), J, and of a policy parameter,  x; and N is em- 
ployment,  a function  of the same  two  variables. 
(2)  VJ-J  +  N(J, x)=O. 
The vacancy  rate, V, is measured  relative  to the number  of jobs: 
(3)  W =  f(U,  V,2x)  +  WO,  fu  <  O,  fv  > O. 
Here, W is the proportional  rate of wage inflation  (1/W - dW/dt),  and 
depends  on built-in or expected  inflation, We, and on the vacancy and 
unemployment  rates.  The NAIRU condition  is 
(4)  f(U,  V, x)  =  0. 
1. This is an elaboration  of a model one of us presented  previously  to serve as an 
organizing  framework  for examining  ways in which labor-market  policies, direct job 
creation  and others, could alter the inflation-unemployment  tradeoff  and the NAIRU. 
See the comment by James Tobin (on Michael Wiseman, "Public Employment as 
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For long-run  equilibrium  the three equations 1, 2, and 4 determine 
U, V, and J as a function  of the policy variable,  x. The number  of jobs, 
J, is directly  related  to aggregate  real demand,  and thus to monetary  and 
fiscal  policies that affect  it. Nevertheless,  J is an endogenous  variable  in 
long-run  analysis,  in the sense that the monetary  and fiscal  policymakers 
seek  the  maximum  J consistent  with  nonaccelerating  inflation. 
The solution  of the system  gives  the  NAIRU, U, and 
()  /v  dU =-Nfv[  -  V-L(  -U)]  +  L(l  -U)fv(l  -  V-Nj) 
-fxJ[L(l  -  U) -N], 
where 
A=Lfv(l-  V-NJ)  +  Jfu[Lj(l  -  U)-Nj]. 
Assume that, with unchanged  policy x, increasing  J raises the vacancy 
rate (1  -  V >  N.)  and decreases the unemployment rate-LJ(1  -  U) 
< NJ. Equation  5 shows  that  a policy  x will tend  to reduce  the NAIRU if: 
(a)  N,  >  0; that is, the policy diminishes  the slippage  between  jobs 
and employment.  This reduction  in the vacancy content of jobs works 
only if f,  > 0-that  is, if the vacancy  rate, as well as the unemployment 
rate,  affects  the  rate  of wage  inflation. 
(b) L, < 0; that is, the policy diminishes  the endogenous  response  of 
the labor  force to the number  of jobs. This also works  only if f, > 0. 
(c)  f,  <  0; that is, the policy diminishes  wage inflation  for a given 
combination  of vacancies  and  unemployment. 
The short-run  Phillips  tradeoff  is (d WI/dJ)  / (d U/dJ). Using  equations 
1, 2, and  3, and  taking  We  as given, 
(6)  dWi/dJ _  fv(l  -  V-  Nr)L  +fu. 
dU/dJ  [LJ(1 -  U)  -  N]JJ 
Policy will make the Phillips curve flatter  if (a)  it raises NJ, (b)  it 
lowers  L relative  to J or reduces  L., (c)  it lowers  fv or the absolute  size 
of fu or both. These three points correspond  to the three points for 
NAIRU. As in that case, points (a) and (b) apply  only if fv > 0. 
This model is illustrated  in figure 1, in which the number  of jobs J 
is measured  horizontally,  the labor force L and employment  N, verti- 
cally. The curve L(J)  indicates  the dependence  of the labor force on 
job availability;  its positive slope represents  the well-known  fact that 
labor-force  participation  is responsive  to job opportunities.  The curve 
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Figure 1. Effects  of Labor-Market  Policy in Reducing  Frictional Unemployment 
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cause  of "friction,"  the transformation  is imperfect.  The vertical  shortfall 
of N(J)  from the 450  reference line J indicates the number of vacancies. 
Unemployment  is the vertical distance  L -  N. In the lower panel, the 
vacancy  rate,  relative  to jobs, and the unemployment  rate, relative  to the 
labor force, are shown. One pair of these rates is consistent  with stable 
wage inflation,  and this determines  the NAIRU and corresponding  jobs, 
vacancies,  employment,  and  labor  force. 
The dashed  lines represent  some  favorable  shifts  due to policy actions, 
perhaps  direct job creation.  As indicated,  these permit  increases  in the 
long-run  equilibrium  levels of jobs and employment,  and a reduction 
in the NAIRU. The gains arise from reducing  the vacancy  rate corres- 
ponding  to any given unemployment  rate. The necessary  assumption  is 
that vacancies  have an independent  inflationary  effect  on wages. On this 
assumption,  a policy that will reduce the vacancy slippage  in N(J)  or 
reduce the induced labor-supply  response in L(J)  will diminish the 
NAIRU. Such a policy will also flatten  the short-run  Phillips  curve and 
improve  the trade  off. 
Direct job creation  could have both effects. The key points are the 
limited eligibility  of workers  for the program  and control of the wage 
rates. Vacancies, if they exist, would not have the normal effects on 
wages, and would not be a reason for job-seeking  workers  to decline 
other  jobs at going wage rates. Similarly,  the selective  eligibility  criteria 
could hold below normal  the response  of entrants  or reentrants  into the 
labor  force  to the  creation  of new  jobs. 
The third  possible  policy effect  is reduction  in the wage  pressure  asso- 
ciated with a given state of the labor market.  Direct job creation  could 
contribute  to this result insofar as employees  under the program  con- 
tinued to look for and be available  for other jobs in nearly the same 
degree  as if they were unemployed.  Keeping  wage rates  for the program 
below the market,  limiting  tenure  in the jobs, and providing  placement 
service  would  encourage  such  behavior. 
Segmented  Labor  Markets  and the NAIRU 
This section explores  the conditions  under  which direct  job creation 
could exploit differences  among labor markets  in order to reduce the 
NAIRU. In the next section  the same  apparatus  is used to analyze  a wage 
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Unemployment  is measured  in persons.  But persons differ  widely in 
the effective  labor  input  they  provide  per  hour.  A natural  first  approxima- 
tion is that effective  labor is proportional  to the hourly wage. At the 
margin,  substitution  of two workers  at $2.50 an hour  for one worth  $5.00 
an hour leaves effective  labor input unchanged,  and presumably  gross 
national  product  as well. However,  it increases  employment  and reduces 
unemployment,  measured  in persons (though the unemployment  reduc- 
tion  may  be partially  offset  by induced  labor-force  entry). 
Suppose  that the true aggregate  Phillips  curve relates  inflation  of the 
wage per  effective  worker to  the  rate of  unemployment  per  effective 
worker.  A low-wage  worker  has a relatively  low weight  in the wage  index, 
and  his unemployment  exerts  correspondingly  little restraint  on increases 
in the index. The NAIRU would be determined  as a certain  amount  of 
wage-weighted  unemployment.  The equilibrium  unemployment  count 
could  vary,  but  not effective  labor  input  or GNP.2 
Substitutions  of  low-wage for high-wage workers, diminishing  the 
number  of persons  unemployed,  might  be regarded  as socially  desirable 
even though  total output  is not increased.  The social disutility  of unem- 
ployment  may depend  in part  on the number  of persons  affected,  not just 
on the sum of labor resources  wasted.  The substitution  of low-wage  for 
high-wage  employment  may  result  in a fairer  allocation  of the unemploy- 
ment required  for restraining  inflation.  The formation  of human  capital 
via work experience,  an output not included in GNP, may be greater 
the more  persons  are employed.  Some of these considerations  apply also 
to other proposals  for sharing  work and unemployment-for example, 
forced  reductions  in hours  of work. 
As a numerical  illustration,  consider  a two-way  split of the labor  force 
into adults  and  teenagers.  The ratio  of an individual  adult  to an individual 
teenager  in Perry's  wage-weighted  unemployment  measure  is 3.05.3 As- 
suming that substitution  in production  can be made at this ratio over 
a relevant  range, employment  of one hundred  teenagers  would displace 
2.  George L. Perry estimated such an equation in "Changing  Labor Markets and 
Inflation," BPEA, 3:1970, pp. 411-41.  The unemployed were classified by demo- 
graphic groups defined by age and sex. Smaller wage weights per person were given 
to unemployed teenagers and females than to adult males. Thus a redistribution  of 
unemployment at the expense of  high-wage workers would lower the NAIRU  in 
persons, but not lower the NAIRU in weighted  persons or raise GNP. 
3. This was computed from Perry's "Changing  Labor Markets" (p. 440).  Since 
Perry has finer disaggregation,  his weights were reaggregated  for the two-way classi- 
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thirty-three  adults. The weighted  unemployment  rate and GNP would 
be unchanged,  but the unemployment  count would be down by sixty- 
seven.4  This calculation  will be a convenient  reference  point for further 
illustrative  estimates,  using  the same  two-way  break  of the labor  force. 
The aggregate  model,  however,  raises  troubling  questions.  If the labor 
inputs  of different  workers  are  perfectly  substitutable  at prevailing  wages, 
what determines  the distribution  of employment?  Why are there such 
great  differences  in unemployment  rates  among  the demographic  groups? 
If the various  types  of workers  are  not good substitutes,  what determines 
their  relative  wages and their  differential  impacts  on average  wage infla- 
tion? 
The most appropriate  model to deal with these questions  seems to us 
to be one that (a) permits  some  flexibility  in relative  wages  and  determines 
equilibrium  relative  wages for the long run; (b)  allows for some substi- 
tution  in production  among  workers  of different  types; and (c)  explains 
the determination  of wages  in different  markets.  Continuing  illustratively 
to use two demographic  groups,  adults (group 1) and teenagers  (group 
2), let L1 and L, be the sizes of the labor force of the two groups,  and 
a1 and  a2 the shares [ao =  L  / (L,  +  L2) ].5 The Ls are assumed  constant 
for the present, an important  assumption  discussed below. Two wage 
rates  call  for two  wage  equations.  Our  specification  is 
(7)  W, = f(ai  Ui, a2U2, -  ln R) +  h1We  +  h'  W;, 
fl  <  A2l  <  04f3l  >  0;  hI,  hI  >  0,  h2  +  h=  1; 
W2 =f2(a, Ul, a2U2, In R) +  hiWf +  h2W , 
f22  <  fi2  <  O,~  f32  >  0;  h2, h2 20,  h2 +  h2 =1 
Both unemployment  rates appear  in each equation. The two types of 
workers  are in some degree  substitutes,  and unemployment  of each type 
restrains  both wage  rates.  However,  the "own"  effects  should  be stronger 
4.  This example does not take account of changes in labor-force participation.  A 
reduction  in the rate of unemployment  of teenagers might encourage more of them 
to enter the labor force. To some extent this would be offset-in  its impact on the 
unemployment  rate-by  a reduction in adult participation. 
5.  Other divisions of the labor force, with n groups rather than two, could be 
handled  by the same type of analysis. A more realistic formulation would be to dis- 
tinguish  m labor markets-say,  industries-in  which distinct wages are determined. 
The n types of labor would participate in varying degrees in each of the markets. 
In the illustrative  two-group  model, however, labor markets  and wage rates are iden- 
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-that  is, each wage rate is more sensitive  to unemployment  of the type 
of labor  in that  market.  The unemployment  rates are weighted  by shares 
in the labor  force; the arguments  a,U, and a2U2  are proportional  to the 
number  of persons  of each type unemployed.  The ratio of the levels of 
the two wage rates, W,/W2,  is expressed  as R. The assumption  is that 
each sectoral  wage rises  faster,  other  things  equal,  when it is low relative 
to the other wage. The h functions are the feedback or expectational 
terms.  The specification  says that an equal increase  in the two expected 
rates  of wage  inflation  will raise  both actual  rates  of wage  increase  W} one 
for one. However,  the two expected  rates  may, if they differ,  have differ- 
ent  effects  in the two  markets. 
Inclusion  of R in the sectoral  Phillips  curves  requires  further  explana- 
tion. Sectoral  Phillips curves are "reduced  form" equations  that reflect 
forces  from  both sides of the labor  market-firms and  workers.  Behavior 
on both sides suggests  that the relative  wage R =  W1/W2 should be an 
argument  in fl and  f2.  First,  employers  pay attention  to relative  wage  levels 
when establishing  their wage offers to the two types of labor.6  Second, 
and perhaps  more compelling,  the job-search  and turnover  behavior  of 
teenagers  or other secondary  workers  will be affected  by their relative 
wage.  At the point  f2 =  0, the excess supply (unemployment)  of group  2 
workers  balances  the inflation  pressure  from excess demand  (vacancies). 
Much of the problem of teenage unemployment,  it is often observed, 
comes  from  dissatisfaction  with  the available  jobs, a gap  between  expecta- 
tions  or aspirations  and  the realities  of miserable  wages  and  working  con- 
ditions. One consequence  is the high turnover among teenagers.  The 
f2=  0 equilibrium,  therefore,  occurs  with very high U2, because  an indi- 
vidual  unemployed  teenager  does not exert  much excess-supply  pressure 
on the market.  If the relative  position of teenagers  were improved-in 
practice,  by improving  working  conditions  as well as by raising  wages- 
each unemployed  teenager  would exert  more effective  pressure,  and the 
equilibrium  would  involve  less dissatisfaction  and  lower  turnover.  In short, 
for a given W2 the required  U2 is smaller  when  R is lower-that  is, when 
the relative  position  of teenagers  is better.  Third,  when  adult  workers  are 
bargaining  for wage increases  they, as well as their employers,  consider 
6. The relative wage is, of course, relevant for employers' demand for labor of 
the two types. This effect is in the labor-demand  functions implicit in equation 17 
below. The behavior of employers embedded  in the f functions has to do with hiring 
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the potential  for substituting  secondary  workers.  When  the relative  wage 
is high, group 1 workers  may moderate  their  own wage demands  or even 
bargain  for higher  group  2 wages  in order  to protect  their  own  jobs.7  Long- 
run  equilibrium  requires  that  the relative  wage  R be constant  and  that  ex- 
pectations  are realized: W, =  W2 =  We  !=  We. Thus the NAIRU con- 
dition  is  that  fl  =  f2  =  0.8  The  aggregate NAIRU  in  persons is  a,U, 
+  a2U2.  The aggregate  NAIRU in wage-weighted  persons is  Ra1U1 
+  a2  U2,  where  R is a reference  relative  wage. 
If the relative  wage, R, is omitted  from equations  7, they determine 
unique  values of both unemployment  rates in the NAIRU equilibrium. 
Specifically,  they determine  a pair  of unemployment  rates (a1U1,a2U2) at 
which  WJ =  W2  =  We ..9 If  this  were  the  correct  specification, 
direct  job creation  would  be unavailing  in the long run.  Hiring  teenagers 
in public jobs would lower their unemployment  rate in the short run, 
drive  up their  relative  wage,  and  lead to the substitution  of adults  for teen- 
agers  in private  employment.  This process,  plus the necessary  policy ad- 
justment  of output to avoid wage acceleration,  would not stop until a 
number  of teenagers  equal to the number  employed  in public jobs had 
been  displaced  from  private  employment. 
With  R included,  the two equations  fl =  0, f2  =  0 determine  a1U1 and 
2 U2, each as a function  of R: 
(8)  al Ul =  s1(R), sb <  0, 
a2U2  =  s2(R),  se  >  0. 
Type 1 unemployment  falls with R; a high W1  relative  to W2  dampens 
the pressure  for wage increases  and thus allows a lower unemployment 
rate.  For like reasons,  type 2 unemployment  rises  with R. In figure  2 the 
locus of combinations  (a1L  U,  a2LU2) that  meet  the  NAIRU condition  is 
shown graphically  as the curve marked  f1 =  f2  =  0  in the upper right. 
7.  Some analysis of behavior of this kind appears in Martin Neil Baily, "Con- 
tract Theory and the Moderation  of Inflation  by Recession and by Controls,"  BPEA, 
3:1976, pp. 585-622. 
8. An expected-price  feedback formulation would imply that the fs are equal to 
the normal growth of labor productivity.  We abstract  from changes in raw-material 
prices, taxes, and other external price determinants,  so the difference between the 
two formulations  is not significant. 
9.  If the cross-effects  are ignored,  the monotonicity  of the two fs ensures  that there 
are uniquely  determined  values of our  U  and a2U2. Allowing for the cross-effects  does 
open the technical possibility of multiple equilibria,  but this possibility  does not look 
very interesting  as an avenue by which to lower the NAIRU. CZ C.)  ~  ~ 
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The  slope  of  this  NAIRU  locus  [O(a2U2)]/[O(aU,)]  iS  SR/sR  and  is 
negative.  Movement  down  the locus, as oriented  in figure  2, is associated 
with increases  in R.'0 
The steeper  the locus is at the point the economy reaches  in the ab- 
sence of policy-for  example,  A in figure  2-the  greater  is the potential 
reduction  in aggregate  unemployment  from policies varying  U, and U2 
along the locus. The total unemployment  count is L,Uj + L2U2, and 
points of equal count, therefore,  lie along straight  lines of slope -1  in 
figure  2. At point A, the locus is steeper  than such a line, indicating  the 
potential  for reducing  the number  of persons  unemployed  by moving  up 
the locus." 
Aggregate  unemployment  in "teenage  equivalent"  units, with persons 
weighted  in proportion  to their  wage rates at point A, is RL,Uj + L2U2. 
Points of equal wage-weighted  unemployment  lie along lines of slope 
-R,  steeper  than 45?. Only if the slope of the locus is steeper  than the 
relative  wage is it possible  to reduce  wage-weighted  unemployment  and 
to increase  GNP (assuming  that relative  wages match relative  marginal 
products). 
We will now show that, under  plausible  assumptions,  the slope of the 
10.  -  (f$A2  +  f%2f);  RA 
=  M(  f2f  fl 2); 
RA 
A  =  f1f22  -  fAf2 
A  is positive  by assumption  of dominance  of "own"  effects.  The  signs  of sl and 4s  asserted 
in the text follow from the other assumptions  in equations  7. 
11. The locus is shown as concave from below. The concavity is not necessary  for 
the results  derived  here; it is only necessary  that the locus be steeper  than the 45? line 
at point A. Concavity is extremely  plausible, however. It suggests decreasing  returns 
to successive  application  of direct  job creation in reducing  the NAIRU. The diagram 
suggests  that there is, in fact, a limit to the process-shown  as the minimum  NAIRU. 
According  to note 10, the locus slope is 
fa2fl  +  2 
f312  +A2f3f 
As U1  increases,  U2  decreases,  and R falls, what happens  to the value of this slope? To 
justify the convex locus shown in figure  2, it must fall. From the curvature  of Phillips 
curves, lfl j falls and If2 I  rises;  these "own"  effects  tend to flatten  the locus. The decline 
in R would be expected, if anything, to raise  fal and lower  f32, reinforcing  the "own" 
effects. The cross terms in the numerator  and denominator  work the other way, but 
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locus  is  likely  to  be  steeper  than  the  relative  wage.  To  simplify  the  ex- 
position,  we  shall  ignore  the  cross-effects  in 7  of  one  group's  unemploy- 
ment rate on the other's  rate of wage  increase,  and take the functions  to be 
linear in R and in the reciprocal  of unemployment.  Thus: 
(9)  =  a, +  -bi  cLR  +  feedback terms; 
W2  =  a2 +  V2  +  c2R +  feedback terms. 
Each  of  these  equations  defines  a  family  of  conventional,  sectoral 
Phillips  curves.  The  higher  the  value  of  R,  the  lower  the  position  of  the 
particular  group  1 curve  that  is  relevant  and  the  higher  the  position  of 
the relevant  group  2 curve. 
Moreover,  each  equation  implies  a tradeoff  between  R  and the  "own" 
unemployment  rate consistent  with equilibrium: 
(10)  (-bJ  ):dui-cldR  =  0; 
(b2) dU2  +  c2dR =  0. 
Directly  from  10, 
(11)  dU  U  dU2_  C2U2 
(11)  ~~~dR  bi  dR  b2 
Now  the slope  of the locus  of equilibria  in figure 2 can be written  as 
L2dU2  _  -L2c2U22b 
(12)  L1dU1  LlciU2b2 
Next,  for  the  present  assume  that  changes  in R  do  not  alter  aggregate 
inflation;  that is, the dollar  value  of the reduced  wage  increase  in group  1 
from  a higher  R  is  exactly  offset  by  increased  wages  in  group  2.  Then, 
c1N,W,  =  c2N2W2, or 
(13)  ~~~c2 
_N1  Wi N_ (N  . 
(13)  cl  N2W2  \N2/  R 
Using  equation  13  in  12  and  simplifying  leads  to  another  expression  for 
the locus  slope: 
(14)  L2dU  -R  (b2(1-  U-)U2 524  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
If the fraction  that multiplies  R on the right  side of 14 is unity, then 
any  movement  along  the locus simply  changes  the number  of unemployed 
teenagers  by R times  the change (in the opposite  direction) in the num- 
ber of unemployed  adults. In that event, no improvements  in wage- 
weighted  unemployment  or in GNP are possible through  policies that 
alter the mix of unemployment,  although  a reduction  of the head-count 
NAIRU is possible. 
There are analytical  reasons for thinking  this outcome is too pessi- 
mistic. To accept it is tantamount  to asserting  that the labor market  is 
operating  efficiently-one can redistribute  unemployment  at the margin, 
but one cannot gain anything  overall.  Not only the minimum  wage, but 
institutional  factors  such as union hiring  rules, employer  discrimination, 
inadequate  information,  geographic  separation  of jobs and inner-city 
youths-and  perhaps  more  diffuse  sociological  factors  such as the legacy 
of alienation  and disillusionment  of younger  workers-all  surely con- 
tribute  to a labor market  that is not efficient.  Intervention  in this labor 
market,  whether  by direct  job creation  or by a wage subsidy,  in favor of 
disadvantaged  workers,  whether  teenagers  or some other group, should 
do better  than  the reference  outcome. 
There is, moreover,  crude  empirical  support  for the same conclusion, 
stemming  from equation  14. In 1974, the unemployment  rates  for adults 
and teenagers  were 4.5 and 16 percent,  respectively.  For the expression 
that multiplies  R to be unity  with those sharply  contrasting  values of U1 
and U2,  the ratio of b2  to b, would have to be 14.4. At the same unem- 
ployment  rate for both groups,  the sectoral  Phillips curve for teenagers 
would have to be more than fourteen  times as steep as that for adults! 
Any ratio  of slopes  below that  would  mean  that a lowering  of U2,  with its 
inflationary  effect just neutralized  by a rise of U1, would lead to more 
GNP as well as a cut in the overall  head count of unemployment.  To be 
sure, there are reasons  to believe that b2 exceeds b, by some margin.  It 
would  be extreme  to suppose  that  the Phillips  curve  for teenagers  is simply 
a vertical  displacement  of the adult  curve.  Entry,  reentry,  and search  are 
much  more  important  for teenagers  than  for adults.  But a ratio  of 14 to 1 
seems implausible.  We feel justified  in suggesting  that the slope of the 
locus  may  well  be above  the reference  value  of R. 
Adding the impact of cross-effects  should steepen the locus slope 
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(f2l)  is negligible  compared  with the effect of adult unemployment  on 
secondary-wage  inflation  (f22). 
So far our model explains ( 1  ) how, via a decline  in R, the adult  wage 
relative  to the teenage  wage, it may be possible  to reduce  teenage  unem- 
ployment  while increasing  adult  unemployment;  (2)  how such a change 
in the mix may reduce  aggregate  unemployment  counted  in persons;  and 
(3)  how it may even diminish  wage-weighted  unemployment.  The argu- 
ment refers  to a "long-run"  equilibrium,  to rates of unemployment  that 
meet the conditions  for the NAIRU, and to shifts of that equilibrium 
when  the  composition  of labor  demand  is shifted  in favor  of teenagers. 
However,  we have not so far taken account  of endogenous  effects  on 
labor  demand  resulting  from  the adjustment  of relative  wages.  The decline 
in R is crucial  to the mechanism  described  here,  but it should  induce  sub- 
stitution of adult workers  for teenage workers  in private employment, 
diminishing  the effectiveness  of direct  job creation.  The offset  is depicted 
qualitatively  in figure  2. In the absence  of direct  job creation  the expansion 
path  of private  employment  is EA. This describes  the mix of employment 
of the two types  of labor  that employers  will offer  at a given  relative  wage 
RO,  specifically  the relative wage that corresponds  to point A  on the 
NAIRU locus  CBA. Path  DC is the same,  displaced  vertically  by the num- 
ber of public  jobs provided  for type 2 workers.  However,  on the NAIRU 
locus, C requires  a lower R than R?. Unless the proportions  in which 
workers  are used is insensitive  to the relative  wage, the expansion  path 
will shift against  teenagers,  rotating  clockwise around  point D. A new 
equilibrium-for example,  B-will  be associated  with a lower  R than  the 
initial equilibrium  A, and with lower private  employment  of both teen- 
agers  and adults.  Private  employment  will be lower  for both groups-this 
would also be true in the absence of substitution,  as at point C-and 
especially  for teenagers. 
An extreme  case, the polar  opposite  of zero substitution  in private  em- 
ployment,  is that the two types of workers  are perfect substitutes,  and 
that the relative  wage  R indicates  the constant  rate of substitution.  If RO, 
corresponding  to point A, is that rate, then point A is the only possible 
equilibrium,  whether  public  jobs are at E or at D. In this case, direct  job 
creation  will be fruitless;  an equal  number  of teenagers  will lose private 
jobs. 
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produced  by the two types of workers,  along with capital  and other  fac- 
tors, assumed  constant.  The production  function  Q  (N1,N2)  has diminish- 
ing returns  to scale;  N1 and N2  represent  employment  of the two types of 
workers: 
(15)  N1 =  Li-  G-  U1L =  L-  -  sl(R)L, 
2  L2=  -G2  -U2L2  =  L2-  G2-  s2(R)L. 
Here G1  and G2  are the numbers  of workers  of the two types  in govern- 
ment jobs. From equation 9,  (Li/L)  U,  =  si(R)  in the NAIRU  equi- 
librium.  The following  system  of equilibrium  equations  determines  Q; w2, 
the  real  wage  of group  2 workers;  and  Rw2, the real  wage  of group  1 work- 
ers, all as functions  of the policy  variables  G1  and  G2.  Private  output  Q is 
a variable  in the sense that, whether  by demand-management  policy or 
by price and wage flexibility,  Q adjusts  to the NAIRU level in the long 
run.12 
(16)  Q =  Q[L1  -  G-  sl(R)L, L2 -G2-  s2(R)L],  Ql,  Q2 >  0; 
Rw2 =  Q[L-G  -  sl(R)L, L2  -G-s2(R)L],  Qll <  0; 
W2=  Q2[L-  -  sl(R)L,  L2-  G2-  s2(R)L],  Q22  _  0. 
The second  and  third  equations  set each  wage equal  to the marginal  prod- 
uct of labor. 
Consider  variation  of G2  by direct  job creation: 
/1  QlsbL+  Q2s2eL  O\/OQ/0G2  -Q2 
(17)  0  QllsRL  +  Q12s2L +  w2  R  J|  =/(G2  - Q12  - 
Q21s L +  Q22sRL  1  09w2/9G2/  \-Q22 
Recall that sl  <  O,  s2  > 0. If the two kinds of labor  were  perfect  substi- 
tutes at the relative  wage R, then an addition  of R units of type 2 labor 
would have the same effects  as that of one unit of type 1. Adding  to N1 
reduces  Q1  at the rate  Q,1;  hence  adding  to N2  would  reduce  Q1  at the rate 
Q,,/R.  If the substitution  is less than perfect,  Q12  will exceed, algebra- 
ically, Q11/R.  The assumption  of imperfect  substitution-RQ12  -Q 
12. There is no explicit modeling of the determination  of the general price level. 
It is simply assumed  that in any steady state the price level increases  at the same rate 
as the two wage rates (we have abstracted  from productivity  change). The compara- 
tive-statics  analysis says that the price level will in the long run adjust  so that the two 
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> 0  and RQ22  -  Q12  < 0-guarantees  that the determinant  A of  the 
Jacobian  in equation  12 is positive.  Also 
(18)  9Q  =  -W2  +  W2L(Rs'  +  s2)(Q12 -RQ22); 
09G2  -  E  + 
OR  1 
(R22  -Q12)  <  0; 
OwG2  1 
=W2 
1 
[_  Q22W2  -  LsR(QQ22  -  Q12)]  >  0O1. 
The first  term of OQ/OG  is simply  the loss of the marginal  product  of a 
type 2 worker  transferred  from private employment  to public employ- 
ment. But if he is worth his wage in the public job, there is no loss to 
society.  The GNP outcome  therefore  depends  on the second  term,  which 
has the sign of  (S2  /-  SR)  -  R. As we have argued  above, GNP will 
increase-and  weighted unemployment  will decrease-if  the slope of 
the NAIRU locus is in absolute  value bigger  than the relative  wage  R. 
In order  to provide  a concrete  example  and,  subsequently,  to give some 
rough estimates  for our findings,  we have used the Cobb-Douglas  and 
constant-elasticity-of-substitution  production  functions  as specific  forms 
for the production  function.  Define a as the elasticity  of substitution  be- 
tween the two types of workers:  a =  1 is the Cobb-Douglas  case. It will 
be convenient  to define  a term  D, equal  to the determinant  A divided  by 
sIL(RQ22  -  Q12).  This term is positive and, with the CES production 
function,  it is given  by 
(19)  D  LR(  ) 
o 
+  2  +  SR1 
The impact  of direct  job creation  (a change  in G2) on GNP is then (from 
equation  18) given  by 
(20)  dG2  D  dGNP  D 
S -  sR  ) 
Inclusion  of the production  side of the model  allows  us not only to find 
the impact  of a change  in G2  on GNP,  but also to give specific  expressions 
for the impact  of G2  on adult  and  teenage  unemployment.  In other  words, 
13. The  inequalities  above  imply  that  QiiQ22  >  Q12. 528  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
we can evaluate  (at least for small changes) the movements  around  the 
equilibrium  locus achieved  for a given  magnitude  of government  employ- 
ment.'4  These  are  given  by 
(21)  AdL2U2  -  SR/S  <  dL0U,-  1  >  O 
dG2  D  '  dG2  D 
so that 
dLU -[(s2/sb)  +  l]/D. 
dG2 
Consider  the interpretation  of the conditions  21. The expression  of D, 
equation  19, has three terms, all of them positive. If the first  two terms 
were zero, then hiring  one teenager  into public employment  (dG,  -  1) 
would reduce  the number  of teenagers  unemployed  by one (dL,U2/dG, 
goes to unity in this case). The increase  in the number  of adult unem- 
ployed would be sR/-s2-that  is, the reciprocal  of the slope of the 
NAIRU locus. This is just enough  to keep the economy  in equilibrium. 
Since  the first  two terms  of 19 are not in fact zero, the overall  impact  of 
an increase  in G2  is scaled  down.  There  are  two reasons  in the model  why 
hiring  one teenager  into a directly  created  job reduces  teenage  unemploy- 
ment  by less than  one. First,  as was discussed  earlier,  the rise in the teen- 
age relative  wage causes employers  to substitute  adults  for teenagers  at 
the margin.  The measure  of this is the term  N2 a/LR ( -s?  ). 
Second,  to achieve  the increase  in adult  unemployment  that  is required 
in order  that  the economy  remain  on the NAIRU locus after  the increase 
in G2,  private  output Q must be reduced.'5  The reduction  of Q has the 
side effect  of reducing  N2 as well as N,. In the example  of the CES  pro- 
duction  function,  the adjustment  of N, and  N, at the margin,  following  the 
change  in Q, occurs  in the same  proportions  as the proportions  on average 
-N2/N,. 
In order to provide some orders of magnitude  for the impact of 
direct  job creation,  estimates  of the parameters  can be inserted  into equa- 
tions  20 and  21. Values  for  N,, N2,  and  L,  and  L2  are  taken  from  data  for 
14. Since LiUi  =  Lsi(R), it follows that dLiUi/dG2  is LsidR/dG2,  which can be 
found easily from equation 17. 
15. This reduction of  Q occurs either by demand-management  policies or by 
price-level adjustment.  The change in Q must be large enough first to overcome the 
tendency to increase N,  generated by the substitution effect described above, and 
then further  to reduce N,. Adult unemployment  must end up higher. Martin Neil Baily and James Tobin  529 
1974.16 Two values  of the locus slope sR /-sR  have been tried-3.05  and 
6.1 -and  results  for both of these values are given. The value 3.05 is 
Perry's  estimate  of R; it is selected  to illustrate  the case in which  GNP is 
unaffected.  The value 6.1 is simply  twice 3.05. Two values  of cr  are used, 
a  =  0.5 and a  =  1.0; higher substitution  elasticity  seems unlikely.  In 
addition  to the ratio  of the ss, we need an estimate  for se, which  appears  in 
D. We know of no hard evidence on this parameter.'7  One way of ex- 
pressing  sR is to ask: if the adult relative  wage fell by 10 percent,  how 
much  would the adult  unemployment  rate have to rise to maintain  equi- 
librium?  We experiment  with two answers.  The first  is 10 percent  also 
for example,  from  4.5 percent  to 4.95 percent.  The second  is 5 percent- 
for example,  from  4.5 percent  to 4.73 percent. 
Table 1 shows,  for different  parameter  values,  answers  to the following 
questions:  if 100 teenagers  are  hired  into directly  created  jobs, how much 
does (1)  teenage  unemployment  (in persons) fall? (2)  total unemploy- 
ment fall? (3)  GNP rise? The range of outcomes is wide. The table 
indicates  how changes  in values of strategic  parameters  affect the out- 
come,  but where  the actual  parameter  values  lie cannot  be known  without 
difficult  empirical  research. 
Variations  in the two labor forces, L,  and L2, were ignored in the 
analysis.  Changes  in these  variables  will not affect  the locus of sustainable 
combinations  of U1 and U2.  However, an increase  in L2 induced  by the 
lower U2  and higher  relative  wage of this group  will make the reduction 
in its measured  unemployment  smaller  than that derived  above. At the 
same time, the production  outcome  Q will be more favorable  on this ac- 
count: some of the induced  entrants  will be employed.  Some  new entrants 
will be drawn  from the ranks  of the discouraged  workers  or the actually 
or potentially  delinquent.  Even if they were not previously  counted as 
unemployed,  it is desirable  to enable them to work. 
Induced  reductions  in L1 are likely to be small,  and hence  to reduce  Q 
only slightly. 
16. From Employment  and Training  Report of the President,  1976 (Government 
Printing Office, 1976). 
17. Robert E. Hall,  "The Process of Inflation in the Labor Market," BPEA, 
2:1974, pp. 343-93, discusses the process by which equilibrium  levels of scale wages 
are restored through changes in rates of wage increase. Michael L. Wachter, in his 
paper in this issue, gives data showing how relative wage incomes of certain cohorts 
have changed. If these data are compared  with unemployment-rate  data that suggest 
persistent  changes in relative unemployment  rates for these same groups, the overall 
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Table 1. Effect  on Unemployment  and  Gross  National  Product  of Hiring 
100 Teenagers  into Public  Jobs 
Unemployment  in persons;  GNP in thousands  of dollars 
Relative-wage  responsiveness& 
Change  In unemployment  High value  Low value 
and GNP  (10 7-10%)  (10 0-5S%) 
=  0.5; NAIRU locus slope = 3.05 
Fall in unemployment 
Teenage  73.4  59.1 
Total  49.4  39.7 
Rise in GNPb  0  0 
=  1.0; NAIRU locus  slope =  3.05 
Fall in unemployment 
Teenage  59.1  42.5 
Total  39.7  28.5 
Rise in GNPb  0  0 
=  0.5; NAIRU locus  slope =  6.1 
Fall in unemployment 
Teenage  84.7  74.3 
Total  70.8  62.1 
Rise in GNPb  158.8  139.3 
O  r-1.0;  NAIRU locus  slope =  6.1 
Fall in unemployment 
Teenage  74.3  59.6 
Total  62.1  49.9 
Rise in GNPb  139.3  111.8 
Source: Based on text equations 20  and 21. See accompanying text discussion, where the symbols are 
defined. 
a.  Assumes that the adult relative wage falls by 10 percent. For the high value, the adult unemployment 
rate rises 10 percent; for the low value, 5 percent. 
b.  GNP calculations assume that the teenage wage is $2.50 an hour and that teenagers work 1,500 hours 
per year. If the same is true in directly created jobs, then, ignoring overhead, the budgetary cost of  100 
such jobs is $375,000. 
Wage  Subsidies  and  the  NAIRU 
The idea of paying  a wage subsidy  to increase  employment  has been 
around  for a long time. Recently,  renewed  interest  has centered  on two 
main  forms.  First, temporary  but general  wage subsidies  have been pro- 
posed as a remedy  for high unemployment,  possibly confined  to incre- 
mental  hiring.  The second, the one considered  here, is a selective  wage 
subsidy  limited to particular  categories  of workers.  For example,  Feld- 
stein has suggested  giving to all teenagers  vouchers  that could be used Martin  Neil Baily and James Tobin  531 
either for schooling or to subsidize employers  who hire them.18 The 
Orcutts  have recently  proposed a wage subsidy  payable to all persons 
who, during  the preceding  twelve months, have been unemployed  for 
more  than  some  stated  amount  of time.19 
Feldstein's  proposal  fits our analysis,  since  it is intended  to improve  the 
position  of a particular  demographic  group.  The Orcutts'  proposal  is not 
covered  under  any  of the classifications  listed  earlier.  It would  presumably 
give the most assistance  to those with the highest  unemployment  rates, 
whatever  their  demographic  group.  In Phillips-curve  terms,  the argument 
must  be that  the disadvantaged-defined  by high  incidence  of unemploy- 
ment  in the preceding  period-exert less restraint  on wages.  This is prob- 
ably true, although  a counterargument  is that persons who have been 
unemployed  a long time are more anxious to find new jobs and more 
willing  to accept  a low wage.20 
Whatever  the details  of particular  proposals,  we should  like to consider 
a wage-subsidy  scheme that benefits the same "group 2" workers as 
direct job creation was assumed to do,  applying the apparatus  used 
earlier  to analyze  the impact  of a wage  subsidy  on the NAIRU. The basic 
assumption  is that expressed  in equation  16. A subsidy  is used to change 
the relative  wage paid by employers  for the two types of labor. Let /3 be 
the policy variable  such that /3w, is the real wage paid by employers  for 
group  2 workers,  where  the subsidy  implies  /8  <  1. The model  used in the 
previous  section  remains  valid  with  ,/w2 substituted  for w2  in the third  part 
of  equation 16.21  The demand-for-labor  equations are combined, as 
before,  with the Phillips  curves  for equation  7. Presumably,  it is the rela- 
tive wage received  R that appears  in equation  7 rather  than the relative 
18. Martin S. Feldstein, Lowering the Permanent Rate of  Unemployment, A 
Study for the Joint Economic Committee,  93: 1 (GPO, 1973). 
19. Guy Orcutt and Geil Orcutt, "A Proposal to Increase Employment" (Yale 
University, February 1977; processed). 
20.  There is even some evidence to support this-at  least the acceptance-wage 
part; see Hirschel Kasper, "The Asking Price of Labor and the Duration of Unem- 
ployment," Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 49  (May  1967), pp. 165-72. 
Another potential difficulty with the Orcutt proposal is the "moral hazard": it is 
difficult and costly to determine whether someone is really looking for work or is 
out of the labor force. In addition,  firmns  would have an incentive to concentrate  tem- 
porary layoffs on a small group of workers (even more than they already do) rather 
than spreading  the burden more evenly (by short-term  plant closings, for example). 
By this means, some workers will build up eligibility for the subsidy. 
21.  We will continue to define R as W1/W2-that  is, the relative wage received. 
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wage  paid  R/p.22 Lowering  ,B has  an impact  on  the  NAIRU  that  can  be 
analyzed  in  a manner  similar  to the  analysis  of  direct  job  creation.  In the 
case  of  a  CES  production  function,  the  outcome  of  the  wage  subsidy  is 
quite  closely  related  to  the  outcome  of  direct  job  creation: 
(22)  dGNP  w2N2o-  SR  2  dL1Ul  -N2o 
df3  D  -sR  I'  d3  D 
dL2U2  _  N20  SR.  dLU  N2o ( sR 
d,3-  D  (-sR)'  dSR  / 
where  the derivatives  are evaluated  starting from ,8 =  1.  They  are simply 
N2a  times  the  corresponding  derivatives  from  direct  job  creation.  The 
counterpart  of  dG2  is  N2u(-dft),  the  number  of  additional  teenagers 
hired  on  the first round  as a result  of  a wage  subsidy  of -d/3.  Subsequent 
adjustments  to maintain  NAIRU  equilibrium  are the  same  in both  cases. 
The  working  of  the  wage  subsidy  is  illustrated  in  figure  3,  which  is 
analogous  to  figure  2.  As  before,  the  locus  CBA  gives  the  combinations 
of  adult  and  teenage  unemployment  that  equilibrate  both  labor  markets. 
Each  point  on  the  locus  is  associated  with  a  relative  wage,  with  higher 
values  of  R  occurring  at points  further  to  the  southeast.  Point  E  repre- 
sents  the  demographic  mix  of  government  employment;  EA  gives  the 
path  of  total  private  and  public  employment  for  various  levels  of  real 
private  output  at  a given  relative  wage  paid  by  employers.  The  slope  of 
the  path  depends  upon  this  relative  wage  paid;  the  path  EA  is  drawn 
for  the  wage  RO that  corresponds  to  point  A  on  the  NAIRU  locus.  If  a 
wage  subsidy  ,B is introduced  and  the  relative  wage  received  remains  RO, 
then  the relative  wage  paid  by firms is R0/13  and the path EA  shifts  to EC. 
But  RO is  no  longer  consistent  with  stability  when  the  unemployment 
combination  is C instead  of A.  The  relative  wage  received  decreases  (W2 
rises relative  to W1)  and the employment  path rotates  clockwise  to EB.  In 
the  new  equilibrium  (that  is,  in  C  as  compared  to  the  original  A),  (1) 
the  relative  wage  paid  by  employers  is higher;  (2)  the  relative  wage  re- 
ceived  is lower  (teenagers  get relatively  more  and firms pay relatively  less, 
the  gap  being  the  subsidy);  (3)  teenage  unemployment  is  lower,  adult 
unemployment  is  higher,  and  the  unemployment  count  is  lower. 
22. Workers  presumably  respond to R in their search and turnover  behavior and 
firms know this when they set wage offers. Note, however, that we do not assume R 
remains  constant. A wage subsidy for teenagers  would increase the demand for teen- 
agers and change the equilibrium  R-that  is part of the process described  below. Cu  z~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C 
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The figures  given  in table 1 also illustrate  the impact  of a wage  subsidy 
of the same total budget  cost as direct  job creation.  If a CES function 
with  elasticity  a is assumed,  a wage  subsidy  is v times  as effective  per  dollar 
as direct  job creation.  Thus, if a =  0.5,  the figures  given for direct  job 
creation  in table 1 should  be reduced  by one-half  to give the effect  of the 
same expenditure  on a wage subsidy.  The two policies are equivalent  in 
this  sense  if a =  1 (Cobb-Douglas). 
Effectiveness  per  budget  dollar  is only  one consideration  in comparison 
of direct  job creation  and  wage subsidy.  More  important  is an evaluation 
of output  resulting  from  direct  job creation  relative  to that  from  increased 
private  employment.  Another  dimension  is the  possible  political  resistance 
of unions  to a wage  subsidy  paid  to private  employers. 
THE  SHORT-RUN  TRADEOFF 
Currently,  direct  job creation  is proposed  as an instrument  of short-run 
fiscal  policy, as part of a package  to stimulate  economic  recovery.  How 
does the short-run  impact  of direct  job creation  differ  from the long-run 
results  obtained  above? 
If WJ  and W2  are given by equation  7, then the overall rate of wage 
inflation  Wis given  by 
(23)  jW  =  Olfl +  02f2 +  feedback  terms, 
where 01 and 02 are the payroll  shares.  If one concentrates  employment 
gains (unemployment  reductions)  on group  2 workers,  under  what con- 
ditions can one (a)  lower overall unemployment,  U = a,U, + a2U2, in 
the short run and keep W constant (in other words, improve  the short- 
run Phillips curve); and (b)  raise GNP (which implies  lowering  wage- 
weighted  unemployment,  Ra,U,  +  a2U2)  in the short run and keep W 
constant? 
For our purposes  "short  run" involves holding the relative wage R 
constant  and the feedback  terms constant.  Cross-unemployment  effects 
will also  be ignored.  If WJis  held  constant  this  gives 
(24)  dW =  Gifitd(a1l  Ui) +  02f2d(a&2U2). 
The  change  in overall  unemployment  is simply 
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The short-run  Phillips  curve is then improved  by programs  for group  2 
workers  provided  that 
(26)  -Olfll  >  -02fi2 
This is a weaker  condition  than those for long-run  improvement,  since 
it does  not  involve  relative-wage  effects. 
The change  in wage-weighted  unemployment  is 
(27)  dUw =  Rd(aiUl) +  d(a2U2). 
Since  it is approximately  true  that  R02/01  =  a2/all  it follows that a non- 
inflationary  short-run  gain  in GNP  can  be made  provided  that 
(28)  -xaifil  >  -a2f2. 
Recall that  fl and  f2  are defined  as functions  of a1U1  and  a2U2.  Thus 28 is 
simply  the condition  that the Phillips  curve for adults (defined  with re- 
spect  to U1) be steeper  than  the Phillips  curve  for teenagers  (defined  with 
respectto U2).22 
Empirical  Evidence 
The possibilities  of "cheating  the Phillips  curve"  by direct  job creation, 
selective  wage subsidies,  or other  labor-market  policies, depend,  accord- 
ing to the theories  presented  in previous  sections, on three hypotheses: 
(1)  Vacancies  are, independently  of unemployment  rates,  important  for 
wage inflation. (2)  Primary  unemployment-of  adult males or of all 
adults-is  relatively  more important  for wage behavior  than unemploy- 
ment of other workers. (3)  Relative-wage  levels affect adjustments  of 
wages  in specific  markets  or industries. 
We have attempted  some econometric  calculations  bearing  on these 
propositions,  and  we present  some  of them  in this  section.  Our  confidence 
in these  results  is limited. 
23.  Lags in the wage equations will affect short-run outcomes. In econometric 
Phillips curves the unemployment variable is often a distributed  lag. For long-run 
analysis the lags do not matter. But the relevant lag distribution  on U1 may differ 
from that on U2, perhaps because wage contracts are more important  in labor mar- 
kets for adults. Even if the Phillips curve for teenagers is fundamentally  flatter  than 
that for adults, this may not translate into improvement  in the short-run  tradeoff if 
the wage effects of unemployment  of teenagers  occur with shorter  lags. X  t  tk  ?  8  o  o  o  o  o?  8  ? 
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In  table 2  we  report several alternative  regressions "explaining" 
economy-wide  inflation.  The observations  are quarterly,  spanning  1958 
through 1976. The dependent  variable  is the four-quarter  proportional 
rate of change of private  nonfarm  hourly wage rates. The explanatory 
variables  are of three types: The first are reciprocals  of unemployment 
rates  for demographic  groups,  adjusted  for the relative  size of the groups 
in the overall  labor  force. The variable  is entered  as a four-quarter  aver- 
age, lagged  one quarter  behind  the dependent  variable.  The groups  used 
were  adults  over  twenty-five,  youths  twenty  to twenty-four,  and  teenagers. 
An additional  regression  uses the unadjusted  rate for males over twenty- 
five, a popular  variable  in other studies.  The second set of explanatory 
variables  was the help-wanted  index  published  by the Conference  Board, 
deflated  by total employment.  A linear four-quarter  average  lagged one 
quarter  is used. The third  set were  wage and price  feedback  variables.  In 
all cases  the variables  used  were  averages  of the four-quarter  proportional 
rates  of change.  The averages  were  for eight  quarters,  lagged  one quarter. 
The wage itself, the consumer  price index, and the deflator  for private 
nonfarm  GNP were  used. 
Partly  on theoretical  grounds  and  partly  based  on Gramlich's  findings, 
the four-quarter  proportional  rate  of change  of the legal  minimum  wage  is 
included as a feedback  variable.24  It is not averaged  but is lagged one 
quarter.  It enters  with a very small coefficient  and is intermittently  sig- 
nificant. 
The macroeconomic  wage regressions  of table 2 support  the proposi- 
tion that vacancies,  via their proxy, the help-wanted  index, are impor- 
tant. Indeed, as a measure  of labor-market  tightness,  this demand-side 
variable  appears  to be stronger  than  unemployment  rates.  Equation  2-10 
of table  2 attributes  a stronger  effect  to the index  than  to the reciprocal  of 
the unadjusted  unemployment  rate for males over twenty-five.25 
So far as the adjusted  unemployment  rates are concerned,  the regres- 
sions confirm the differential  importance  of  primary unemployment. 
Indeed, the secondary  rates are insignificant  and their coefficients  have 
the wrong sign. Doubtless, collinearity  is part of the reason why it is 
24.  Edward M. Gramlich, "Impact of Minimum Wages on Other Wages, Em- 
ployment, and Family Incomes,"  BPEA, 2:1976, pp. 409-51. 
25.  We make no claim that the help-wanted index explains the shifting Phillips 
curve. "Other  factors"  may have caused trends in the index that are correlated  with 
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difficult  to estimate  the  relative  importance  of several  unemployment  rates 
in wage  behavior. 
Partly  to see how well the findings  of the aggregate  wage equations 
held up at a slightly lower level of aggregation,  and partly to test the 
importance  of relative-wage  levels,  various  Phillips  curves  were  estimated 
for wages in seven major  sectors.  The results are shown  in table 3.26 
The same  adjusted  unemployment  rates  and  deflated  help-wanted  index 
were  used as in the aggregate  wage equations.  Of the feedback  variables, 
only  the  two  price  indexes  and  the minimum  wage  were  used.  Experiments 
with wage feedbacks,  both sector own wage and aggregate  wage, were 
not encouraging.  Collinearity  was a severe problem.  We concluded  that 
wage-feedback  terms  were not so appropriate  in sectoral  equations  in- 
cluding relative-wage  levels. In practice, the wage-feedback  variables 
generally  reduced  the significance  of the relative  wage.27 
The relative-wage  variable  is important  in specification  of the sectoral 
equations.  The hypothesis  used in the theoretical  analysis  was that a rise 
in the wage of a sector  relative  to other  wages would reduce  the rate of 
increase  of the sector's  wage.  A variable  defined  as the ratio  of the sector's 
wage to the index of private  nonfarm  wages was included as a moving 
average from t -  1  to  t -  8. The  results are reported in column 9  of 
table 3. The hypothesis  receives  rather  strong  empirical  support.  For the 
six sectors excluding  construction,  there are sixteen equations  with the 
expected  sign and two with  perverse  signs-neither significantly  positive. 
Many of the negative  signs are significant.  Even including  construction, 
the sign count is sixteen  to five. Such a consistent  pattern  would be un- 
likely if the true  coefficient  were  zero or positive.  Construction  wages  be- 
haved in a notoriously  unpredictable  way over the period. The finding 
that construction  workers,  having achieved a high relative wage, were 
induced  to bargain  for even  larger  wage increases  is not inconsistent  with 
anecdotal  evidence  about  the  industry. 
The hypothesis  that  unemployment  among  older adults (column  2) is 
more  important  as a determinant  of wage  inflation  than  the unemployment 
26.  The sectors are manufacturing;  wholesale and retail trade; services; mining; 
transportation;  construction;  finance, insurance, and real estate. The wage data are 
from Employment and Earnings, various issues. More complete results, matching 
those of table 2, are available from the authors. 
27. An exception is the construction industry, in which wage feedbacks turned 
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among  youths  and teenages  (columns  3 and 4) is generally  confirmed  by 
the sectoral  equations. 
The superiority  of the deflated  help-wanted  index as a measure of 
labor-market  tightness  is supported  by the manufacturing,  transportation, 
and  mining  equations,  but  not  by the other  sectoral  equations. 
The coefficient  of the minimum-wage  variable,  though  generally  small, 
continued  to be both significant  and robust across specifications.  The 
service  sector  was the only one with consistently  perverse  negative  signs. 
It is not unreasonable  that  an increase  in the minimum  wage  would  throw 
workers  into the service sector, causing  a downward  pressure  on wages 
there. The coefficients  and statistical  significance  of the minimum-wage 
variable  in finance,  insurance,  and real estate seem too good to be true. 
There are other odd features  of this sector-the  relative-wage  variable 
has an  incorrect  sign,  for example. 
Our general conclusion  from the regressions  is that the hypotheses 
necessary  for success  of direct  job creation,  wage subsidies,  and kindred 
policies  are  empirically  supported,  at least qualitatively.  But our  previous 
analysis  makes  us skeptical  of the more  extravagant  hopes and claims  for 
these  policies,  especially  in the  long run.  Gains  in GNP are  harder  to come 
by than  reduction  in unemployment  counts.  In the  long run,  displacements 
of workers from private employment,  both in and outside the target 
population,  will offset  some  of the direct  employment  gains.  A large  share 
of the case for direct  job creation  or selective  subsidies  depends  on im- 
portant  effects not captured  in aggregate  measures  of employment  and 
production:  improved  distribution  of income  and  opportunity. *D  X  S  ?  W  ~~~~~~~~~t  It  en  1-  .  c 
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Discussion 
CHARLES  HOLT  and  Michael  Wachter  complimented  the authors  for mak- 
ing an important  analytic  contribution  to an area  of crucial  social  impor- 
tance  that has not been sufficiently  explored.  As Wachter  interpreted  the 
main  thrust  of the paper,  he concluded  that  direct  job creation  shifted  the 
burden  of unemployment  from  one group  to another.  Its effectiveness  de- 
pended  upon the relative  slopes  of the group  Phillips  curves.  If teenagers 
had a sufficiently  flat  Phillips  curve,  the overall  NAIRU would  be lowered 
by shifting  employment  toward  them,  but still at some cost in higher  un- 
employment  of adults. 
In response  to a question,  James  Tobin  reviewed  the conditions  under 
which  the wage-weighted  unemployment  rate  would  not fall even though 
a conventional  unemployment  rate that counted  the number  of persons 
was reduced.  If one adult  was a perfect  substitute  for three  teenagers,  re- 
placing  an adult  with  three  teenagers  would  do nothing  for wage-weighted 
unemployment  or real GNP but would reduce  the number  of people un- 
employed.  Tobin noted that such a shift  might  be deemed  socially  desir- 
able for reasons  such as income distribution  and human  capital,  a point 
endorsed  by Thomas  Juster.  Benjamin  Friedman  suggested,  however,  that 
taking  into account  the dependents  of workers  might  lead to a social  pref- 
erence  for  jobs  for adults. 
There  was some discussion  of the relative  effects  on wage inflation  of 
hiring  teenagers  and adults.  Tobin argued  that the relative  wage weights 
gave  no clear  guide  to the relative  inflation  effects.  If adult  wages  are  three 
times  those of teenagers,  employing  three  teenagers  would  not necessarily 
have the same total inflationary  impact  as hiring  a single adult.  He saw 
reasons  to believe  that  the  former  would  be less inflationary.  George  Perry 
said that some of the institutional  barriers  to employment  of teenagers, 
such as minimum  wages, might reduce the wage response  from hiring 
teenagers,  thus tilting  the balance  in the direction  suggested  by the paper. 
Robert Hall was concerned  that the entire analysis  rested on the re- 
sponse  of the relative  natural  unemployment  rates  of the two demographic 
groups  to their  relative  wages.  He knew  of no evidence  at all that  bore  on 
this issue. He thought  the authors'  conclusions  could be established  in a Martin  Neil Baily and James Tobin  543 
way that was less dependent  on their  particular  model.  He was skeptical 
of that  model  because  it assumed  that  the widely  different  unemployment 
rates observed  among teenagers  and adults at full employment  repre- 
sented  an equilibrium-not a differential  excess  supply  of teenagers.  Hall 
saw evidence  that there  was excess supply.  Contrary  to popular  notions, 
he contended  that  less than one out of ten unemployed  teenagers  become 
unemployed  by quitting;  about half the teenage  unemployed  have never 
held a job; more than half have permanently  left school and are looking 
for full-time  work. Hall inferred  a serious  and chronic  shortage  of jobs 
for those teenagers  willing  to work  at the prevailing  wage. He suspected 
that legal barriers  to market  equilibrium  played a major  role. These in- 
cluded  the minimum  wage,  but also various  "fair  labor"  legal provisions 
of equal  pay for all who perform  the same  job. If the wage for teenagers 
is kept artificially  high by such legal arrangements,  direct job creation 
will not raise  it appreciably.  The paper's  conclusions  will thus stand,  but 
for reasons  quite  different  from  those  the authors  had  implied. 
Arthur  Okun countered  that high turnover  provided  an adequate  ex- 
planation  of high teenage  unemployment  in equilibrium.  Hall's own pa- 
pers on turnover  were persuasive  to him. It was greater  frequency  of 
spells, not longer  duration,  that swelled  the unemployment  rate  for teen- 
agers  relative  to that for adults.  The pool of unemployed  relative  to the 
monthly  flow into jobs was smaller  for teenagers  than for adults.  Okun 
also cited Wachter's  findings that wages in low-paid jobs rose more 
rapidly  than  those in higher-paid  jobs during  cyclical  upswings  (although 
he conceded  that differential  lags may affect  that result). On the whole, 
Okun cautioned  against  concluding  that the Phillips  curve  for teenagers 
was  very  flat. 
Several  participants  discussed  ways of dealing  with the teenage  unem- 
ployment  problem.  Martin  Feldstein  emphasized  ensuring  that jobs pro- 
vided skills and training  and not simply employment.  Lower minimum 
wages  would  allow  employers  to spend  more  money  on training  teenagers. 
James  Duesenberry  observed,  on the other  hand,  that  low-wage  jobs gen- 
erally  had only a small training  component;  he doubted  that a lowering 
of the minimum  wage would do much  to encourage  training.  Juster  cau- 
tioned that it was difficult  to distinguish  operationally  between  jobs that 
provided  skills and those that did not. The counter  clerk  at McDonald's 
might  later  become  an assistant  manager.  Robert  J. Gordon  noted  that  the 
most serious  problem  affected  black  teenagers.  Jobs were  often available 544  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
in the suburbs,  but not the ghettoes.  It was not just a matter  of subsidiz- 
ing  jobs,  but  of locating  them  close to those  that  need  them. 
Gordon  noted that the increased  share  of teenagers  in the labor  force 
in the past two decades  provided  evidence  of how markets  adjusted.  In 
principle,  the increased  share  could  reduce  relative  wages  of teenagers  or 
raise their  unemployment  rates.  His own work suggested  that the effects 
were  split approximately  50-50; that  was consistent  with  the Baily-Tobin 
model, in which the relative  wage has some, but not perfect,  flexibility. 
Gordon  suspected  that the minimum  wage  held down  the degree  of flexi- 
bility  substantially. 